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ABSTRACT: Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits have presented thoughtful
comments and provocative challenges to my article “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of
Self?” Their challenges raise significant questions about the nature of illusion, whether
Buddhism is denying the self in all senses of the term, whether there could be a self that exists for
some limited duration of time and has at least some measure of control, whether there is a
phenomenal illusion of self, whether the neuropsychological assumptions embedded in Thomas
Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model is consistent with Buddhist metaphysics, the usefulness of
evolutionary psychology in explaining why we have the illusion of self, whether the I-sense is a
result of natural selection or cultural selection, vipassanā meditation as a form of verification
and its usefulness for extinguishing the I-sense. The discussion here is my response to these
criticisms through which I further clarify and develop my arguments and, in some ways, amend
my position
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I am honored to have Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits comment on my
article. Since their comments and criticisms overlap, I will be organizing my responses
to them by grouping their criticisms within a number of topics, often responding to
more than one of them within a given topic. In assessing their responses to each of my
claims, I intend to do the following: (a) I will seek to clarify my claims when I think
they are misunderstood; (b) I will attempt to respond to arguments that I think require
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more argumentation on my part; and (c) I will consider ways in which I might need to
revise my position in light of their arguments.
1. WHAT IDEA OF THE SELF IS BEING DENIED AND THE PĀLI CANON
I begin with a discussion of what is being denied in Buddhism, and I reaffirm that while
the idea of the self that fits the nine criteria elaborated in my article is being denied, the
self is not being denied in all senses of the term. Smith says that my using the Pāli
canon as a starting point for this is suspect, since it is a mistake to claim “that the Pāli
suttas give us any clear understanding of what the historical Buddha actually thought.”
But I am making no such claim. I do not claim to know whether these suttas accurately
reported what the Buddha said in general or specifically about the self or even if there
was a historical Buddha. Furthermore, even if these suttas accurately recorded what the
historical Buddha said, they would still not tell us what he actually thought. But all this
is not relevant to my starting point. The reason that I begin with the Pāli canon is
because all Buddhist schools recognize its suttas as the words of the Buddha and,
therefore, the criteria for the self that is being denied by these suttas would be accepted
by all of them. Vaidya, however, claims that there are significant variations across
schools, suggesting that they vary on “whether the self is momentary or that there is no
subject of experience.” I have two replies to this. First, it is the dharmas and not the
self which are momentary, and all Buddhist philosophical schools accept the
momentariness of the dharmas (however they may differ on the ontological status of
the dharmas). Second, while there is some disagreement about how to characterize the
subject of experience, none of the philosophical schools regard the subject of
experience as a self, as an entity which observes my experiences and yet is distinct from
them. In short, while demonstrating this by examining the way in which each of the
schools deny the self is beyond the scope of this response, I believe that all Buddhist
philosophical schools, however they might differ in particulars, would deny that there
exists a self that has any of the nine characteristics that I indicate.1
Smith raises a question about my claim that I am not denying the existence of a self
in all senses of the term. He equates this with my saying that “the Buddha wasn’t a fullblown anti-realist about the self” and that I am “portraying the suttas as agnostic about
the existence of the self.” It is important for me to make clear that I am not claiming
that Buddha was agnostic about the existence of an entity which has the nine
characteristics that I discuss at the beginning of my article. Buddha, as portrayed in the
Pāli Canon, was, I believe, indeed a full-blown anti-realist about there being any such
entity. However, it is often the case that when people first learn of the anattā doctrine,
they are perplexed, thinking that what is being denied is the non-existence of
themselves as persons. It then needs to be explained that there are indeed persons
1

I will, however, concede that one of the approximately 18 schools of early Buddhism – the Pudgalavādin
school – did have a concept of the person which imports at least one of the characteristics of the self which
are denied. We know about them primarily through the critique of their position by Vasubandhu. However,
this school did not survive, and the texts that we have which represent the thinking of early Buddhism is
the Pāli canon of the Theravada school or the Chinese agamas.
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understood as a set of aggregates which have both synchronic and diachronic
continuity. At this point someone may declare that such a set of aggregates is a self,
specifically a process self. Indeed, some philosophers of Buddhism have suggested that
Buddha does not deny the existence of a process-self.2 The process “self” is the sum of
the psychophysical processes that constitute the person, and so, as I say in my article,
in order to avoid confusion it is better to use the term ‘person’ for the sum of these
processes; and the person, while conventionally real, is not ontologically real. My
overall conclusion is that Buddha is indeed an anti-realist as regards the existence of
the self as an ontological entity, but he did not deny the existence of the self in all senses
of the term.
Vaidya brings up another worry as regards the nine characteristics that I claim are
being denied by Buddhism. “…the reasons that go into showing that one kind of self is
an illusion don’t automatically transfer over to saying that another kind of self is an
illusion. For example, just because there isn’t a permanent self across time, it won’t
follow that there isn’t an independent self for some portion of time.” And conversely,
that “the self isn’t independent, because everything is dependently originated, isn’t
sufficient for showing that there is no controller self or self as subject of experience
that last longer than a moment.” This may, in fact be correct, but I do not think that it
matters. What I have tried to do is draw out nine characteristics of self that I take to be
denied by all the schools of Buddhism and to whose denial at least most Buddhist
thinkers would agree. Furthermore, while it is possible to analytically separate these
characteristics, many of them do mutually implicate each other. For example, an
ontologically independent self would need to be a unitary and bounded self. Also, since
the boundary lines of the self designate the body and its experiences, it would be a self
that owned these things.
2. THE ARGUMENTS
In my article, I mentioned what I take to be the strategy of the main philosophical
arguments from the Pāli Canon for the Buddhist denial of self. I characterized these
arguments as a reductionist strategy which reduces the person to a set of psychophysical
process – the skandhas, or aggregates. I point out that the reductionist strategy develops
two parallel arguments which I call criterion arguments, arguing that the aggregates
both individually and collectively cannot fulfill the criteria of what it means to be a
self. The two criteria are, respectively, the criterion of permanence and the criterion of
control. Vaidya challenges each of these arguments. On the criterion of permanence,
Vaidya grants that the aggregates are constantly changing, but he argues that this does
not rule out the possibility that there could still be a semi-permanent self, a self that “is
a phase of a person. Something that exists for some amount of time, but not for all time,
and is a subject to change as well, but serves other cognitive roles during each phase,
such as decision making and being the subject of experience, accounting for diachronic
2

See, for example, Gowans 2003, 91-103. Gowans argues that while the Buddha did deny that there
were substance-selves, he believed that we are process-selves until we attain Nirvāṇa.
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knowledge…” His argument for this employs Husserl’s phenomenology of internal
time consciousness to insist that our time sense includes pro-tension (intention toward
the future) and re-tention (intention toward the past) and that, therefore, there must be
duration beyond the moment. Thus, he concludes that the Buddhist argument which
employs the criterion of permanence does not prove “that there is no sense of self at all
that has some duration of time, longer than a moment, and less than forever.” On the
argument based on the criterion of control, Vaidya argues that we experience at least
limited control without which we could never have formed the concept of control which
is being denied; and such control, he argues must presuppose a self, an agent who has
at least some measure of control.
I will take the argument for the agent who exercises control first. It is certainly true
that we experience intentions, decision making, and actions to fulfill these intentions.
But to conclude from these experiences that there must be an agent who intends,
decides, and acts begs the question. What we can properly conclude from these
experiences is that there are intentions, decisions, and actions; and the Buddhist
understanding of dependent origination explains how these come about as a result of
previous psychophysical processes. The idea that they require an agent that is in some
sense separate from the stream of these processes presupposes the existence of such an
agent; but that is precisely what is in question. The problem in modern western
philosophy goes back to Descartes who argued that since I can doubt and since doubt
is a form of thinking, there must be an “I” who is thinking. But what Descartes should
have concluded is simply that there is thinking going on. Similarly, what we can
conclude from our experience of intending and deciding is that these experiences are
occurring as part of the ever changing stream of experience. The feeling of control
comes not from our experience of a self-determining entity, but our experience of some
of the aggregates exercising control over other of the aggregates – what Siderits, who
Smith refers to in his reflections on my article, calls “a shifting coalition” of physical
and psychological process in which at any given time some of these processes performs
the executive function in relation to other parts, but there is no part which is always the
controller. What I suspect is behind Vaidya’s challenge is the conflation of self with what
Buddhism calls ‘person’. However, the person is only conventionally real, because it is
constructed from psychophysical processes – momentary dharmas – which are, at least
for early Buddhism, ultimately real. This echoes the idea of the person proposed by the
Pudgalavādin school – one of the schools of early Buddhism which did not survive –
and which is now rejected by every existing school of Buddhism.3 I think that the same
conflation of person with self is behind Vaidya’s proposal of a “self” that is a semipermanent “phase of a person” whose aggregates are constantly changing. Why not
simply say that the person is the totality of the changing aggregates throughout one’s
life.
Let me now say something about being the subject of experience and Vaidya’s
argument which employs Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time consciousness. I
certainly experience myself as the subject of my experience in the sense that my
3

This is not to say that all contemporary Buddhist thinkers reject this idea.
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experience is from a certain perspective. But that this perspective is inhabited by a self
is what is in question. When I look at my computer screen at the moment, I see it from
a certain spatial perspective. In general, I would say that it is from the perspective of
my body, but that it is my body is a convention of language, not a metaphysical truth.
The question of what is the best analysis of internal time consciousness is more
complex, and I admit having some sympathy for Husserl’s account. Husserl’s
phenomenology attempts to analyze the lived experience of the continuity of time as
opposed to the idea of a quantitative objective metaphysical account of time. Once we
perform the phenomenological reduction, we are aware of experiencing a succession
of mental states in which our sense of how fast or slow time moves does not coincide
with clock time. This is reflected in ordinary speech when we say that the time moved
very slowly while listening to a boring lecture. What we experience is not an objective
succession of “nows” in objective time but “now” as a point of orientation from which
one experiences perceptions, feelings, memories, expectations, fantasies, hopes, etc. as
belonging to the present, past or future. Thus, our sense of “now” already “re-tends” a
sense of what is past and “pro-tends” what is to come. Listening to music provides a
good way of seeing this, as the sound we are hearing now is a melody only if it retains
the sound of the past and anticipates the sound to come. However, the appeal to
Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time consciousness will not help Vaidya’s
proposal. What it helps us to understand is how the pro-tension and re-tension of the
structure of time consciousness can still exist in the moment as memory and
anticipation. Put another way, since consciousness is intentional for both Buddhism
and Husserl, each moment of lived experience intends both the past and the future.
Thus, the “self” that is the “phase of the person” or perhaps the whole of the person
through life is a causally connected succession of a momentary constellation of
psychophysical processes, each of which manifests an intentional structure toward the
past and the future. There is no self which has the characteristics that are being denied
by Buddhism which inhabits the person. The “person” identified as the totality of these
processes is conventionally real, but since it is composed of and constructed by the
dharmas, is not ultimately real.4
Before I leave the discussion of the arguments for no-self, I want to respond briefly
to a criticism that Smith makes concerning these arguments. Smith notes my claim that
the criterion arguments against the self are not sufficient unless we add the
exhaustiveness claim, the claim that there is nothing more to the person than the five
aggregates. However, he takes issue with my entertaining the possibility that the self
could be something beyond the aggregates and my claim that we need to argue against
this. In contrast, Smith insists that the exhaustiveness claim is already provided in the
Pāli suttas, and he quotes one of the suttas which says that the brahmins who are being
challenged by Buddha’s arguments regard the self as either one of the aggregates or all
of them collectively. I take Smith’s point to be that we need not entertain the idea of a
4

Whether or not the dharmas are ultimately real is open to debate. While all schools of Buddhism would
agree that the person is empty of self and cannot be ultimately real, the dharmas are ultimately real for
the Abhidharma of the Pāli canon but not for Madhyamakas for whom the dharmas are also empty of
intrinsic nature.
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self beyond the aggregates, since those who claim that there is a self do not identify it
with anything beyond the aggregates. If this is what Smith has in mind, I find his
position puzzling for two reasons. First, as I pointed out in my article, the Buddha was
surely aware that traditional Brahmanical thinking posited the ātman as the true self
which transcends the individual person and which was both permanent and the ultimate
controller. Secondly, even if Buddha or his disciples were not attempting to challenge
the idea of a self that transcended the aggregates, it is certainly reasonable to consider
this today. This is not a question of being a Buddhist modernist or of embracing modern
scientific anti-realism about the self but of making the best philosophical arguments for
the claim that there is no self.5 However, my point in developing these arguments was
not to definitively prove by philosophical argument alone that there is no self, and my
discussion of these arguments is essentially an attempt to retell briefly what I take to
be some of the main arguments that have been made by others. As I make clear in the
article, I do not think that the doctrine of no-self can be established by argument alone.
My purpose in recapitulating these arguments in my article is not to defend any
particular Buddhist version of them but to make plausible and lay the groundwork for
my discussion of the self as an illusion.
3. WHAT IS AN ILLUSION?
In my article I defined illusion in three ways – as involving motivation (beliefs based
primarily on wishes and desires), as a cognitive illusion (a false belief which is so
interwoven with other aspects of our cognitive system that it is difficult to dislodge),
and as a phenomenal illusion – and I claim that the self is an illusion in all three senses.
Since Vaidya defines illusion as something perceptual and argues that the self is not
something that we can perceive or misperceive, it cannot be an illusion in any of the
three senses. This seems to be an attempt to win the argument by definition. While it is
true that it is common in psychology to focus on perceptual illusions, there are many
other senses of the term often used by philosophers, by psychologists, by social and
political theorists, and by people in ordinary speech. I have already in my article cited
Freud’s use of the term for my first definition of illusion as motivated by human wishes.
Here is another example of illusion based on wish from Marx. “The abolition of religion
as people’s illusory happiness is the demand for their real happiness” (Marx 1994, 28).
Here is an example of its use in contemporary psychology that is not about perceptual
illusions. “The illusion of control is the tendency for people to overestimate their ability
to control events; for example, it occurs when someone feels a sense of control over
outcomes that they demonstrably do not influence” (Wikipedia). Here is a current
example, quoted in the Merriam Webster Dictionary, of the political use of the term in
daily newspapers during the year 2020. “All week long, Republicans at the
nonconvention convention tried to create the illusion that the pandemic is largely a
5

In modern western philosophy, raising this question comes easily after Descartes’ cogito and Kant and
Husserl’s transcendental ego. In modern Hindu philosophy, the argument for no-self needs to confront
the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta. I am not, after all, addressing ancient Buddhist thinkers but modern
readers who may be skeptical of the Buddhist claim that there is no self.
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thing of the past”. I would add to these uses, illusions about personality traits and
character dispositions. I may think of myself as a kind, generous, and cooperative
person, but, if this is not true, it is reasonable to say that I am under the illusion that I
am kind, generous, and cooperative. In short, Vaidya’s definition of illusion as
applying only to perceptual misrecognition seems unnecessarily and radically
restrictive. In addition, the substantive question cannot be settled by definition. Even if
we decide to restrict the term ‘illusion’ to perceptual illusions, we are still left with
questions about the ways in which reality is misrepresented because of our desires and
wishes, because of our cognitive apparatus, because of our language structure, or
because of the way things appear to be. If we do not want to apply the word ‘illusion’
to such cases, then we can simply use another word, for example ‘illuziya’ which is the
transliteration of the Russian word for illusion (‘иллюзия’). Having made that
distinction, we could still ask the questions – Is the self an illuziya? If so, what kind of
an illuziya is it?
Vaidya, of course, insists that the self is not an illusion (or even an illuziya) in any
of the three senses which are the focus of my discussion, since he makes clear that he
thinks that there is a self which, while not permanent, is at least semi-permanent and
exercises many of the cognitive functions that are traditionally ascribed to it. I have
already given my response to this in the previous section, so I will not discuss again
here. But I do want to say something about what Vaidya considers a paradigm case of
a perceptual illusion – mistaking a coiled rope for a snake. While this is a clear case of
something appearing as other than what it is, it is not a perceptual illusion simpliciter.
As Vaidya admits, I see the coiled rope as a snake not merely because it looks
somewhat similar to a snake but because “my fear [italics mine] of the latter triggers a
foul up in my perceptual processing;” and fear is motivated by the desire or wish to be
safe. It is the wish to be safe and the fear of snakes that motivates my seeing the coiled
rope as a snake. Furthermore, there would not be a fear of snakes unless one had a
concept which groups a variety of animals into one classification – snake – and has
learned through experience to fear them. In all, this “perceptual” misrecognition has
built into it both motivational and cognitive elements.
Nonetheless, Vaidya raises what might seem to be a more substantive issue using
the rope-snake illusion. By coming closer, I can recognize that it is a rope and, thus,
extinguish the illusion. This, however, requires that there be someone for whom the
illusion is extinguished, someone for whom “extinguishing the illusion is a case of
diachronic knowledge change.” But that someone is me. This, Vaidya asserts, entails
that there must be “a self that had an epistemic change in light of a perceptual change.”
If there is no self, for whom is the illusion extinguished? To answer this question, I will
repeat what I have said in my article. Diachronic unity – and hence, diachronic
knowledge – can be explained by the concept of dependent origination, which means
that it is not necessary to resort to the concept of self to explain it. Thus, to answer the
question for whom is the illusion extinguished, we need again to distinguish the concept
of a person from the concept of a self. It is the person who comes to recognize that
what appeared as a snake is really a rope. However, the person is a conventional reality,
and the indexicals ‘I’ or ‘me’ are simply useful ways of speaking. In short, what is
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really happening is a set of continuous impersonal processes connected causally
through time. Here is one (admittedly) linguistically awkward rendition of what is
really happening. Certain psychophysical processes occur at time x such that certain
fears and beliefs in conjunction with distance from the coiled rope generate a perceptual
snake-like appearance. At time y (later than time x), as the physical organism
approaches the rope, new perceptions occur which override the fear and create beliefs
that what is seen is not a snake but a rope. On this rendition, the answer to the question
for whom is the illusion extinguished is: “for no one.” The illusion of the snake is
extinguished, but there is no one for whom it is extinguished. There was perceiving and
thinking that the rope was a snake, and now there is perceiving and thinking that the
rope is not a snake; but there was and is no perceiver or thinker.
4. THE SELF AS A PHENOMENAL ILLUSION
I think what is really under attack in Vaidya’s analysis of illusion is my claim that the
self is not only a motivational and cognitive illusion but a phenomenal illusion. Vaidya
suggests that my model for extinguishing the illusion of self is the Kanizsa square
illusion, and offers two criticisms of this. First, one can train oneself to dispel the
Kanizsa illusion (Vaidya switches from the Kanizsa square illusion to the Kanizsa
triangle illusion) by seeing the black objects as packmen or as slices of pizza. This can
be done, he claims, by uttering the mantra “packman, packman” as we look at the
figure. If the mantra works, this would make the Kanizsa illusion different than the
Müller-Lyer illusion which is perceptually impenetrable. Second, referring to Hume’s
introspective analysis, Vaidya argues that since we do not perceive the self in the first
place, there is no way to misperceive it, and, hence there is no way to correct the
perceptual illusion. Thus, in contrast to the rope-snake or the Kanizsa square illusion,
both of which can be corrected, the self cannot be a perceptual illusion; in which case,
since Vaidya claims phenomenal illusions are perceptual illusions, the self cannot be a
phenomenal illusion. I shall consider this second criticism first.
In my article, I explained a phenomenal illusion as something which appears
differently than what it is, and, when introducing the term, I did say that this could also
be called a “perceptual” illusion. Given Vaidya’s second criticism, I must now amend
this as follows. A phenomenal illusion is an illusion in which what exists appears to be
something other than what it is, but, while a perceptual illusion is a phenomenal
illusion, not all phenomenal illusions are perceptual illusions. The word ‘appears’ can
have two meanings. In the first case, it is indeed perceptual, like the Kanizsa square or
the rope-snake illusion. However, we can also use ‘appears’ in the sense that some
experience or set of experiences appears to the mind to be something other than it is,
because of the way the mind spontaneously structures or reacts to that experience.
Thus, certain mental phenomena may create the feeling or intuition that they reveal
something that does not exist. In some cases, this feeling or intuition may be based on
sensory data which is not processed consciously; for example, I might have feeling that
there is danger in the this environment without knowing why I have this feeling (and
there might be, in fact, signs of danger which I was only aware of subliminally). In
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other cases, it may be based on certain specific emotions. I can feel that I am in love,
but it may be really the desire to be loved that I feel. I may experience an emotion that
I think is anger, but careful attention to the emotion may reveal that it is really fear. I
may have the feeling that I am in control, but it is an illusion based on my failure to
recognize that I have been manipulated. And so, in the case of the self, I have an
immediate feeling or intuition that there resides deep inside me something unitary and
enduring which is also a control center and owner of my experiences and which
demarcates me from others. This is the phenomenal illusion of self which, although
pre-conceptual, tends to produce a belief that the self exists. Siderits defines it nicely
in his response to my article. “To call the self a phenomenal illusion is to say that our
experience possesses the phenomenal character that leads to our judging that we have
a self.” However, for reasons that I will soon discuss, Siderits denies that there is such
a phenomenal illusion.
To return to Vaidya’s second criticism, it is certainly true that when we introspect
we find that there is no perception of the self to be found. Thus, if the self does not
exist, all we have is a mistaken belief which our introspective experience can
disconfirm. That this analysis leads to the conclusion that the self cannot be a
phenomenal illusion is odd, since Buddhism also recognizes that in vipassanā
meditation, which is a much more controlled form of introspection than anything Hume
had in mind, there is no self to be found. However, there is something observed in
vipassanā meditation which disconfirms the I-sense – the arising and disappearing of
various mental and physical processes which either individually or collectively may be
mistaken for the self.6 The phenomenal illusion of self is the spontaneous feeling that
these processes are “mine” or that “I” am in control of them and that there is some
essential “me” that does not change even as these processes continue to arise and
disappear; and this leads easily, if not also spontaneously, to a set of metaphysical
beliefs that misrepresents the person as having a self.
Let me now turn to Vaidya’s first criticism of the self as a phenomenal illusion.
Vaidya takes me to be saying that my model for extinguishing the illusion of self is the
Kanizsa square illusion which by careful attention to the space between any of the two
black objects can be seen to be an illusion but which then reappears as soon as one
steps back from that careful attention and looks at the figure as a whole. Here again is
the Kanizsa square illusion.

6

One other difference between Hume and Buddha is that, for Buddhism, these psychophysical processes
are causally connected.
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I do indeed use the Kanizsa square illusion to discuss what it might mean to have a
phenomenal illusion and the difficulty of extinguishing the illusion of self for very long
at the phenomenal level. However, I need to clarify how I understand the relation
between the phenomenal illusion of self and the Kanizsa square. I use the Kanizsa
square illusion not as a model of the phenomenal sense of self but as an analogy to
explain both how an illusion can continue to exist even when we know that it is an
illusion and the difficulty of maintaining a consistent non-self perspective at the
phenomenal level, to explain why even after we move further along path, we would
still oscillate between a non-self and a self-perspective. The point of this analogy is to
say that just as we can oscillate between seeing that the Kanizsa square is an illusion
through careful attention to the space between the black objects and then having the
illusion reappear when we look at the figure as a whole, so through the careful attention
in vipassanā meditation, we can come to extinguish the phenomenal illusion of self
only to have it reappear when we step back from the attentional focus. If the Kanizsa
square illusion would be a model rather than simply an analogy for the illusion of self,
then the phenomenal illusion of self would be a perceptual illusion; but for the reasons
that I have discussed above, it is not a perceptual illusion.
Look again, dear readers, at the whole figure which constitutes the Kanizsa square
illusion. Does the illusion of the square really disappear when one says “packman,
packman” repeatedly? Vaidya claims that the mantra works to dispel the illusion. I have
tried this mantra and found that it does not work, so at this point I can only invite my
readers to do the experiment. And if it does seem to work at least momentarily, let me
ask my readers if they are really observing the figure as a whole or, through the
hypnotic effect of the mantra, are instead shifting the focus from the figure as a whole
to the space between two of the black objects; or perhaps shifting so rapidly from a
focus on one space between the black objects to another that it is easy to fool oneself
into thinking that one is observing the figure as a whole.7 However, suppose that
Vaidya is correct in claiming that it is possible to penetrate the illusion even when
stepping back and looking at the figure as a whole. What would follow from this is
simply that it is a bad analogy, not that my analysis of the phenomenal illusion of self
is wrong. I would simply need to choose another example for the purposes of analogy
– perhaps the Müller-Lyer illusion which Vaidya grants is not penetrable even when
one knows that the lines are equal.8
I mentioned earlier in this section that Siderits, whose definition of a phenomenal
illusion of self I quote approvingly above, nonetheless does not think that the illusion
of self exists at the phenomenal level. So if there is no illusion of self at the phenomenal
7

Perhaps this is why Vaidya prefers the Kanizsa triangle illusion to the Kanizsa square illusion, since in
the triangle illusion there are only three “packmans” and spaces between them to contend with instead
of four, making it easier to fool oneself while rapidly shifting from one portion of the figure to another.
8
However, the Müller-Lyer illusion would present a problem as an analogy to the way vipassanā could
extinguish the illusion, as to make the analogy work, we would need to make the meditation process
analogous to using a ruler to measure the lines. Since vipassanā does not require anything other than
one’s own mind, the Kanizsa square illusion works better as an analogy for my purpose.
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level, there is no experience that “possesses the phenomenal character that leads to
our judging that we have a self.” To take another one of Siderits characterizations of
the self as a phenomenal illusion, there is nothing in “the felt character of our
experience” that “leads us to spontaneously affirm that they are given to or for a
particular experiencing subject, me.” Siderits argument is nuanced, especially as he
does not deny that there is an I-sense. However, he insists that this I-sense is not a
“delusive phenomenal character” but is instead “the name of a bundle of cognitive and
affective habits that continuously reinscribe belief in a self that serves as center of
meaning and value.” Thus, Siderits would agree that the I-sense tends to lead us to the
develop certain beliefs, including the belief that there is some entity within us that can
be characterized as a self, but these beliefs are formed not by what appears
phenomenally but by a set of cognitive and affective habits.
Before analyzing Siderits reasoning for this conclusion, I want to make an
observation about my understanding of the I-sense that I am equating with the
phenomenal illusion of self. In my article, I explained the I-sense in terms of
experiential data open to phenomenological analysis. In my article, I also gave several
examples of the I- sense – looking in the mirror and immediately apprehending a sense
of self inhabiting the body, feeling myself as a self-determining agent, episodic
memory in which when I remember a past event I remember myself in that past event,
and experiencing myself as distinct from others with whom I interact. I would not deny
that these experiences are bound up with certain cognitive and affective habits.
However, I would claim that in addition to these habits there is also an experiential
phenomenal character to the I-sense. Put simply, I think there is an immediate
phenomenal “feel” to the sense of self and that we can say a number of things about
this through phenomenological investigation.
I now want to examine Siderits’ arguments for his claim that the I-sense is not a
phenomenal illusion of self. I would break his argument into the following components:
1. It is unlikely that there is a single heritable feature of the brain that produces
the I-sense, given the many tasks that it is meant to perform; and it cannot be a
straightforward result of natural selection, because it does not appear until later
in childhood when the child attributes mental states to herself; and it is most
likely in its full development the product of socialization to one’s culture. Thus,
if a phenomenal illusion is a phenomenal presentation brought about by the way
the mind naturally structures our experience, it is unlikely that there is a
phenomenal illusion of self
2. When we investigate the phenomenal character of our experience, we not only
do not find a self (as Hume noted) but at the most find that in addition to the
intentional object of our experience, there is also the awareness of that object.
However, any attempt to examine the content of that awareness is always
elusive (as Brentano noted).
3. Episodic memory need not contain a phenomenal sense of self. For example,
that a visual experience triggers a memory of the object as pleasurable leading
to a present desire for that object can be expressed in in purely impersonal
terms. In other words, we can describe the process as a causal series of mental
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events associated with this brain and body without employing the indexical ‘I’.
What leads us to think that ‘I’ stands for some single enduring substance is
simply our habitual use of that indexical rather than something in our
phenomenal experience.
4. While Siderits agrees that extinguishing the illusion of self requires more than
philosophical argumentation, this is not because it requires extinguishing the
phenomenal sense of self, as there is, on his analysis, no phenomenal sense of
self to be extinguished. What maintains and reinforces explicit beliefs in the
self is a bundle of cognitive and affective habits which constitute the I-sense.
Thus, to extinguish the I-sense requires extinguishing these cognitive and
affective habits.
Since I intend to discuss the first argument in the next section of this response,
where I will focus on the criticisms to my use of neuroscience and evolutionary
psychology, and the last argument in the concluding section, where I will focus on
concerns about my analysis of extinguishing the illusion of self, I will now in the rest
of this section focus on Siderits’ second and third argument.
Siderits’ second argument is a phenomenological one. The question then is what is
it exactly that we find when we do the phenomenological analysis? I would certainly
agree that we do not find a self as the object of our awareness. But what about the
awareness itself? It is true that when we attempt to focus on the awareness, it eludes
us. This is because to focus on it is to try to turn it into an object, since awareness is
awareness of the object. For example, I can focus on my thinking about the problem of
the self, but then my thinking about the problem of the self is not my primary
awareness, because now I am thinking about my thinking about the self. So I grant that
I cannot find the illusion of self through this procedure, but I do not think I need to do
so. The illusion of self at the phenomenal level is not a “seeing” something that I
mistake for a self, the way I might mistake the coiled rope for a snake. Nor is it an
appearance of something that is not there, like the appearance of the square in the
Kanizsa illusion. Rather, as I have tried to explain above, it is a strong feeling or
intuition that there is something that is operating in the background that I do not directly
see.
In my article, I explained the phenomenal sense of self through analogy with the
perceptual illusion of the Kanizsa square, and this lends itself to the confusion that I
have discussed above. I hope now that I have put this confusion to rest. Let me offer a
different kind of analogy. Imagine that the I-sense is a way of organizing our experience
in something like the way a computer program organizes data (again, this is an analogy
only). This organizing program groups experiences into forms of self-cherishing and
self-grasping. The former distinguishes my interests from the interests of others, and
gives my interests a central priority. The latter entails that I take the primary object to
which I am attached as me and must defend it at all costs.9 As a result, I develop a
9

I am indebted to Jessica Locke for pointing out the implications of these concepts. “Selfcherishing…establishes a polarized phenomenal field, structuring our world such that whatever we
experience comes to us through a prism of self-interest” (Locke 2018, 252). “The self-grasping
orientation…causes us to defend the interest of this metaphysically dubious and ethically problematic
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variety of cognitive and affective habits that make the program of self-cherishing and
self-grasping seem all the more natural. This is why we cannot “see” the self but
nonetheless feel or intuit that the self exists. The phenomenal “feel” of the self is not a
perceptual experience and, in fact, is not any one specific experience but permeates all
my experiences, as it is the way, given the program, that those experiences are
organized. It is also why it is difficult to see through the illusion, and if the mind were
only this program, it would be impossible to dispel it. Thus, while I feel or intuit that
there is something operating in the background, I am not entirely wrong. What is
operating in the background is the program of self-cherishing and self-grasping, but,
given the way this program organizes my experience, what I feel or intuit is a unitary
and enduring and controlling self who is the owner of my experiences.
Let us now look at Siderits’ third argument. It is certainly true that I can describe
episodic memory impersonally, without reference to any first person indexical.
However, that I can describe it that way does not mean that this is my experience. In
my ordinary (pre-enlightened) experience, when I have a memory of eating a mango
that I enjoyed, I do not just remember the mango and the enjoyment but see me in the
memory; that is, I not only remember the mango and what it tasted like but also
remember that I was there and that it was me eating the mango. In contrast to this, there
are pathological conditions where the individual remembers the scene but has no
memory of being there. There is, for example, the case of R.B. who, as a result of a
head trauma, said that he could recall past experiences but “that the recalled experience
didn’t seem like they were experiences that happened to him” (Garfield 2018, 295).
There are also psychological techniques where people suffering from PTSD are taught
to recall the traumatic event from a third person perspective in order to reduce anxiety
(Garfield 2018, 297-298). Thus, it is at least possible to have memories in which
experiencing a past scene is without an I-sense. My point here is not to equate these
experiences with the Buddhist experience of selflessness but to contrast such
experiences with what I take to be the normal experience of episodic memory in which
there is a phenomenal sense of self.
Before leaving this section, I want to explicitly amend my understanding of the Isense. I said above that I would not deny that the experiences that I am characterizing
as the phenomenal illusion of the self are bound up with the bundle of cognitive and
affective habits that continuously reinscribe belief in a self. Given my account of the
phenomenal sense of self as a kind of program which organizes our experiences into
forms of self-cherishing and self-grasping, I would now suggest that these cognitive
and affective habits and the experiential sense of self-cherishing and self-grasping
mutually reinforce each other. Thus, I would amend my understanding of the I-sense
to say that it is intersection and interpenetration of the phenomenal illusion of self and
a set of cognitive and affective habits which together provide the ground for the belief
in the self as an ontological entity.
self” (Locke 2018, 260). However, while she uses these concepts to discuss the phenomenological
structures that organize our experience and orient us to our (pre-enlightened) life-world, the computer
analogy is mine. I have used this computer analogy previously to discuss the problem of universal
compassion in an earlier article that I wrote. See Struhl 2018.
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5. NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY,
AND THE ILLUSION OF SELF
In my article I draw on neuropsychology to help explain how the illusion of self is
constructed and evolutionary psychology to help explain why it was constructed. Smith
takes me to task for my use of neuroscience and both Smith and Siderits pose criticisms
of my use of evolutionary psychology. Before examining their arguments, I want to
make clear what my purpose was in using these disciplines.
Buddhism provides excellent resources for recognizing that the self is an illusion,
both by providing philosophical arguments and methods of meditation which support
those arguments. It provides an insightful analysis of the role of this illusion in causing
dukkha, and it offers a path for extinguishing the I-sense and dukkha. It does not,
however, say very much about how the illusion of self is constructed and even less
about why it is constructed. As Siderits notes in his comments about my article, the
main explanation that Buddhism gives for why the I-sense is constructed is that it is
result of “beginningless ignorance” which perpetuates itself through a series of rebirths
until one is enlightened. But we have no explanation for why there is this
“beginningless ignorance.” Why would human beings construct an illusion if it only
serves to produce suffering? As Jack Engler puts it, “If the sense of separate selfhood
is illusory, a way of organizing experience that is not reality based and inevitably
creates anxiety and conflict, why do we repeatedly and consistently construct
experience around it….Buddhism not only doesn’t elaborate on how this sense of self
is constructed, it doesn’t address why we construct it….” (Engler 2003, 77).
Engler tries to fill this lacuna through a Buddhist informed psychoanalytic
approach.10 In my article, I chose to use the resources of neuropsychology and
evolutionary psychology. I do not claim that these resources are sufficient, and I also
suggested that there is a social and narrative dimension to the construction of self. I am
also open to the help of other contemporary resources that could help explain how the
illusion of self is constructed and what purpose it might serve. This is not a question of
being a Buddhist modernist, although it is certainly the case that each culture and each
age has reinvented and must continue to reinvent Buddhism in a way that speaks to its
collective life-world. Thus, if there are good reasons to think that the self is an illusion
which brings about suffering, then we should use what resources we have at our
disposal to understand that illusion, to understand how it is constructed, what its
function is, and how we might proceed to extinguish it. In the twenty first century, we
have resources at our disposal that Buddha could not have known. Why not use them.
Of course, we must proceed with caution when we do this, which is why I welcome the
reflections of Smith and Siderits on my use of neuro- and evolutionary psychology.
Now, to their arguments.
10

Engler, who is both a Buddhist practitioner and psychotherapist, argues that the illusion of self is a
“compromise formation in the psychodynamic sense; a psychological structure that emerges to confront
a ‘danger situation’ by binding anxiety and warding off unwanted and unwelcome knowledge and the
aversive feelings that knowledge evokes” (Engler 2003, 78). The “danger situation” to which Engler
refers is not the fear of death, which already presupposes the sense of self, but the fear of emptiness.
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Smith argues that my use of Thomas Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model (PSM)
is inconsistent with Buddhism, because Metzinger is committed to physicalism.
Physicalism, in this context, is the view that “phenomenal states are identical with brain
states” and, therefore, that brain states cannot be the cause of mental states, because
“they are mental states.” From this, Smith thinks it follows that “what makes the self
an illusion is that it is merely a neural simulation.” On this basis, Smith argues that
there is a fundamental difference between Metzinger’s understanding of how the
illusion of self is constructed and Buddhism’s analysis. For Buddhist philosophers,
“mental categories corresponding to what we would call ‘consciousness’ are
explanatorily basic,” which is to say that the reduction of the self is to “phenomenal
kinds which are…metaphysically basic.” The contrast, according to Smith, is
straightforward. “For Buddhist philosophers, the reduction base contains phenomenal
kinds, for Metzinger the reduction base is strictly neuro-physical.”
I need to make clear at the outset that there is nothing in my analysis which commits
me to physicalism or which posits the identity of mental and brain states. Smith’s
argument attributes such a physicalist metaphysics to me because: (a) he assumes that
Metzinger is an identity theorist; (b) I use Metzinger’s analysis of the PSM to explain
how the phenomenal illusion of self is constructed; and (c) therefore, I too must be an
identity theorist. But one can use someone’s analysis without being committed to their
metaphysics. I take no position on physicalism or identity theory. I suspect that the
mind in some way supervenes on brain functions, but that does not mean that mind is
reducible to the brain. I do not know if it makes sense to say that phenomenal kinds are
metaphysically basic or neural processes are metaphysically basic or even that there is
anything which is metaphysically basic.11 In fact, I think that my refusal to take a
position on this question is consistent with the Cūlamālunkya sutta (MN 63, I 426-32)
where Mālunkyāputta, one of Buddha’s followers, insists that Buddha tell him the
answer to four questions. One of these questions is whether “the soul is the same as the
body” or “the soul is one thing and the body another.” Buddha’s response to all four
questions is to use the simile of a man struck by a poisoned arrow who refuses to pull
it out unless certain questions are answered; after which Buddha concludes that he does
not think it useful to answer any of these questions, since it will not help anyone
overcome suffering and attain Nirvāṇa. So, in the spirit of the Buddha, and while I
would acknowledge that the question of the relation of the mind to the brain can be
philosophically interesting, I also have no need to try to answer it here. In addition, it
is not clear to me that Metzinger’s analysis of the PSM, whatever his metaphysical
commitments, requires that the analysis itself presupposes the identity of mind and
brain. The Phenomenal Self Model that Metzinger employs may be, as he argues,
generated by brain processes, but his description of them is phenomenological. When,
for example, he first introduces the PSM, he does so with a phenomenological
description of the rubber hand illusion. He uses this illusion to demonstrate how the
physical boundaries of what we take to be self can change. He then proceeds to discuss
11

One way of interpreting Madhyamaka Buddhism’s insistence on the emptiness of all phenomena is
that there is nothing that is metaphysically basic, including even emptiness.
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other ways in which the phenomenal self illusion is experienced. In fact, were he not
able to provide such phenomenological descriptions, there could be no way of
correlating the PSM with brain processes. For my purposes, the PSM is useful in
helping us to understand some aspect of how the I-sense is constructed. That the PSM
is causally connected to neural processes does not mean that it is only or “merely” the
result of these processes or that it is nothing but these neural processes. Finally, suppose
physicalist/identity metaphysics was correct. That alone would not establish that the
self is an illusion, since everything we experience, including our perceptions, feelings,
intuitions, and beliefs, would then be neural processes as well. There would still be a
difference between illusion and veridical perceptions, between feelings that something
is happening and whether it actually is happening, and between beliefs which are true
and those which are false. In other words, the phenomenal sense of self would be a
neural process whether or not there was a self.
Finally, I do not think that there is a necessary contradiction between the Buddhist
analysis of the illusion of self and Metzinger’s analysis, because they are answering
different questions. Buddhism does not reduce the self to the aggregates. What is
reduced is the person to the aggregates. This reductionism does not explain how the Isense is constructed, whereas Metzinger’s analysis of the PSM is an attempt to do this.
My use of evolutionary psychology raises some additional questions. Smith
presents several objections to my assumption that the phenomenal illusion of self, as a
result of natural selection processes, must have had and still has a useful function for
the human organism. His first objection is that if the PSM has causal efficacy, it ought
to be considered real from a Buddhist perspective, since, for Buddhism, “having casual
efficacy marks it as real.” I think this objection confuses ultimate and conventional
reality. For Buddhism, causal efficacy is ultimately the property of the dharmas
resulting in the coming to be of other dharmas. But on the conventional level, we can
still say that when persons believe certain things, this will cause them to act in certain
ways; and that, on the basis of certain feelings and perceptions, they may come to have
certain beliefs. Thus, if someone is thirsty and sees a mirage of a lake in the desert, this
illusion will lead that person to run in that direction. On the level of ultimate reality, all
this can be explained as the way that certain dharmas bring about other dharmas. To
return to the problem of the PSM having causal efficacy, the I-sense on the level of
ultimate reality consists of certain dharmas that will bring about other dharmas.
Smith’s second objection is to argue that my use of Metzinger’s PSM suggests that
the function of the I-sense is to be a central causal agent. As against this, Smith refers
to Siderits’ analysis of the way in which control shifts from one part of the psychophysical processes to another, and that no one part is always the controller. This misses
the point of saying that the illusion of self has a useful function. Its function is not to
act as an agent who has executive control. Quite the contrary, what Siderits’ analysis
demonstrates is that we can explain the feeling of agency without there being an agent
who has executive control. What has a useful function is not the phenomenal self as an
agent but the phenomenal illusion of being an agent. What is useful is not that there is
a phenomenal self in charge, because there is no one who is in charge. What is useful
is the illusion that there is someone in charge.
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Finally, Smith objects to my use of Robert Wright’s evolutionary psychology,
because evolutionary psychology assumes that “our minds are the results of selections
that have shaped our cognitive habits.” This Smith insists is at odds with the Buddhist
path which would promote “seeing things as they really are.” There are several issues
packed into this objection. First, evolutionary psychology makes in one sense a stronger
claim – that certain features of both our cognitive and affective habits are the result of
selection pressures. Second, as I will explain below, the claims made by evolutionary
psychology are not as strong as Smith suggests, as at least some its proponents
recognize that there is a significant interaction between our genetic inheritance and
social factors in the formation of our cognitive and affective habits. Finally, Robert
Wright does specifically believe that although selective pressures have shaped the
illusion of self, Buddhism has resources to transcend this genetic inheritance; and I
have suggested in my article that through vipassanā meditation in conjunction with
other components of the 8-fold path it is possible to do this. Put simply, the human
mind not only has forms of illusions built into it but also has capacities to “see things
as they really are” and, therefore to escape from at least some of the “influence of our
genetic programming.”
At this point I need to confront two substantial criticisms that Siderits levels against
my use of evolutionary psychology. The first involves a general criticism of
evolutionary psychology, because it presupposes that “the brain is organized around a
number of heritable mental modules.” This, Siderits argues, is challenged by our
understanding of the plasticity of the human brain. When one part of the brain is
damaged, its tasks are often taken up by other parts. Thus, while allowing that certain
functions of neural organization might be best explained as the straightforward result
of natural selection – e.g., certain universal features of our visual system – it is highly
unlikely that the phenomenal illusion of self could be generated by “a single heritable
feature of brain organization.” This is because the phenomenal illusion of self serves
a number of functions, and that would a present a “serious engineering challenge,”
given that it would involve “a large number of systems” responding to a “large variety
of relevant stimulus conditions.” I have several responses to this general criticism of
evolutionary psychology and the possibility of it helping us to understand why the
illusion of self developed. First, while evolutionary psychology has in much of its early
formulations relied on the module metaphor, the metaphor is now the subject of intense
debate within the discipline, and many of those who continue to use it also recognize
the plasticity of the brain and distance themselves from the attempt to take metaphor
too literally.12 Secondly, Wright himself rejects many of the standard (mis)
12

The idea of an evolutionary psychology goes back to Darwin who suggested that mental faculties may
be the result of both natural and sexual selection. In contemporary evolutionary psychology, the initial
assumption behind the modular metaphor was that psychological mechanisms that had evolved by
natural selection to solve problems confronted in our evolutionary past were domain-specific. However,
it is now widely accepted by many, if not most, evolutionary psychologists that the brain may be a
combination of both domain-specific and domain-general features. Furthermore, that some
psychological mechanisms are domain-specific refers to their ability to solve specific problems and does
not necessarily entail that they exist in one compartmentalized site within the brain. In fact, many
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interpretations of the modular metaphor and suggests that it might be better to think of
them as networks or systems.13 Third, it is not necessary to think of the phenomenal
illusion of self as hard-wired into the brain in order to see the relevance of evolutionary
psychology. It is possible to understand what is heritable not as a specific set of modules
but as a varied set of genes that develop the phenomenal illusion of self in conjunction
with a variety of social conditions; and that this development permeates a number of
the neural systems; in which case, it is not difficult to understand how one part of the
nervous system might take over certain functions of the phenomenal sense of self when
other parts are damaged. Finally, that the development of the I-sense at the phenomenal
level might represent ‘a serious engineering challenge” is not necessarily a telling blow
against it. Evolutionary development is so full of solutions to serious “engineering
challenges” that earlier philosophical theists like William Paley and contemporary
philosophers like Anthony Flew, take them as evidence that there is some SuperIntelligent Designer who designed them.14 The answer by evolutionary theorists like
Richard Dawkins to such theistic claims is that the grid of natural selection is sufficient
to account for these solutions to complex design problems.15 Thus, even though the
illusion of self performs a number of functions and even if it were solely based on a
modular system in the brain, it would not from the evolutionary point of view pose a
“serious engineering challenge.” I do not, however, think that the phenomenal illusion
of self can be reduced to neural networks in the brain, and this leads me to a discussion
of Siderits’ second criticism of my use of evolutionary psychology.
I have already granted in the previous section that the phenomenal illusion of self
is only one of the components of the I-sense, the other being what Siderits calls the
“bundle of cognitive and affective habits that continuously reinscribe belief in the self,”
and I have added that these components interpenetrate and mutually reinforce each
other. I now want to consider Siderits’ second criticism which, as I will explain below,

evolutionary psychologists allow that genes do not specify neural wiring in detail and recognize that
neural networks are interconnected and subject to environmental influences. See Krill 2007 and Bolhuis
2011.
13
Specifically, he rejects the conceptualization of modules “as a bunch of physical compartments”
located in specific parts of the brain, because brain scans reveal that a module may draw “on various
regions of the brain, sometimes drawing more on one region, sometimes more on another;” he rejects
the idea that modules are “like the blades on a Swiss army knife or the apps on a smart phone,” since
there is “much more interaction among and overlap between different mental modules; and he rejects
the interpretation of modules as like “departments in a company’s organization chart,” since modules
may compete as well as collaborate, and there is no hierarchy among the modules (Wright 2017, 87-88).
14
Paley compared the human eye to a camera, and Antony Flew became a Deist after being a famous
philosophical agnostic for most of his career. He was first led to question his agnosticism on the basis of
reflections on the complexity of the double helix. See Flew 2007.
15
“What makes natural selection succeed as a solution to the problem of improbability, where chance
and design both fail at the starting gate? The answer is that natural selection is a cumulative process,
which breaks the problem of improbability up into small pieces. Each of the small pieces is slightly
improbable, but not prohibitively so” (Dawkins 2008, 147). The result is that the accumulation of small
pieces can create a more complex structure that only seems highly improbable, because it is thought of
as occurring all at once.
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pushes me to clarify and further amend my position, while still insisting that the
phenomenal illusion of self has significant biological evolutionary roots.
While allowing that there are some psychological aspects present in the human
brain at birth – e.g., a tendency to gaze more fixedly at smiling faces and gaze detection
– Siderits argues that it is not until much later in the child’s life, approximately when
the child is four years old, that the sense of self emerges. This is because it is not until
the child reaches this age that it is able to fully develop “a theory of mind that is first
applied to others and only then applied to oneself.” On this basis, Siderits argues that
“insofar as the older child has been subjected to socialization in its home culture,” the
I-sense would be predominantly the product of that socialization. From this, Siderits
draws the conclusion that the I-sense is primarily the result not of biological evolution
but of cultural evolution, “not of natural selection but of cultural selection.”
This strikes me as an odd conclusion. It doesn’t follow that because the sense of
self emerges from interaction with others that it is the result of cultural selection.
Cultures are incredibly different, and what we need to explain is the universality of the
I-sense. Siderits’ only explanation for this universality is that cultures which did not
have the sense of self did not survive; hence, cultural selection. But this assumes that
there were a variety of human cultures which did not have an I-sense and, therefore,
proved not to be successful. But if the I-sense is a result of applying a theory of mind
to the other and then applying it to oneself, what would be the situation of child rearing
in which that would not happen. Of course, there is the legendary idea of the “wolf
child” who survives without early human interaction and does not develop a sense of
self, but then wolf children are not going to initiate a human culture. Thus, it is unlikely
that without an I-sense a human culture would ever come to exist in the first place. Still,
I think there is one part of Siderits’ discussion of the cultural evolution of the I-sense
that I think is correct. Different cultures do organize the I-sense in different ways.
Clearly, the hyper-individualist I-sense of contemporary American culture is not the
norm, even for all cultures existing today, and there is good reason to think that the Isense throughout history was organized in quite different ways. The sense of self in
European feudal culture was certainly markedly different than the sense of self in
modern capitalist culture; and, given its Confucian underpinnings, the sense of self in
Chinese feudal culture would be different from its form in European feudal culture.
Now I would agree that the sense of self is constructed through interaction with
parents or other caretakers in the first several years of the child’s life, and I explicitly
made use George Herbert Mead’s analysis to make this point in my article. While
Siderits recognizes that I did this, he points out in a footnote that I sometimes seem to
be saying that the “phenomenal self is innate but only becomes manifest through
normal developmental processes.” As I read over my article with this in mind, I must
admit that I did indeed say several things that would lend itself to this interpretation,
and I did not offer enough discussion of the way in which the innate components that
give rise to the sense of self interact with the later social elements that construct it. So
let me clarify by using Chomsky’s analysis of language as an analogy. Chomsky claims
that we have an innate universal grammar which constrains the forms that language can
take and makes possible both the development of many different kinds of languages
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and the creative use of language.16 This universal grammar is then elicited by the child’s
exposure to the specific language (or sometimes more than one language) of its social
environment, but the various world languages, even though they all obey the rules of
the universal grammar, do exhibit differences that are significant. In short, the innate
universal grammar is by no means the whole of language lying dormant in the infant at
birth, simply waiting to be elicited. By analogy, I would suggest that what is innate is
a set of neural connections which make it possible for the child to interact with others
and, in the first few years of life, to apply a theory of mind to others and then to itself
or, to use Mead’s analysis, to see itself through the vantage point of other specific
persons and eventually from the vantage point of the group as a whole. These
interactions do elicit the core of the sense of self but not the whole of it. Eventually, as
children learn the language of their culture, they also learn various linguistic activities
(‘language games”), including the use of indexicals; they internalize those activities
and – given the tendency to essentialize and wish to endure – further develop their
sense of self; and then through narrative construction this culminates in the full
development of the sense of self – the autobiographical self. In other words, the sense
of self does not exist in a fully developed latent form at birth, simply ready to be turned
on by the social environment any more than French, English, Chinese, or Japanese exist
already in a latent form at birth. What exists innately are certain neural components
which generate certain kinds of interaction and an ability to draw certain conclusions
from those interactions (e.g., ability to know the mind of the other, sometimes called
“mind reading”); and the inevitability that, under normal social conditions, the child
will do so. From there, the sense of self develops its specific cultural form, as the child
is socialized by the language, literature, media, and norms of its culture.
6. VIPASSANĀ, EXTINGUISHING THE I-SENSE, AND THE BUDDHIST PATH
I now need to consider two other criticisms raised by Smith and Siderits, respectively.
In my article, I emphasized vipassanā meditation as a method for seeing through the
illusion of self, for verifying the main assumptions of the arguments for no-self, and,
in conjunction with other components of the 8-fold path, as a way of extinguishing the
phenomenal illusion of self and developing a sense of selflessness, a non-self
perspective. However, I further argued that, even as one approaches enlightenment and
16

In an interview with Kevin Doyle, Chomsky talked about the relation of human nature to language:
“There is nothing regressive about the fact that a human embryo is so constrained that it does not grow
wings, or that its visual system cannot function in the manner of an insect, or that it lacks the homing
instinct of pigeons. The same factors that constrain the organism's development also enable it to attain a
rich, complex, and highly articulated structure….Take language, one of the few distinctive human
capacities about which much is known. We have very strong reasons to believe that all possible human
languages are very similar; a Martian scientist observing humans might conclude that there is just a
single language, with minor variants. The reason is that the particular aspect of human nature [italics
mine] that underlies the growth of language allows very restricted options…..It is these very restrictions
that make it possible for a rich and intricate system of expression of thought to develop in similar ways
on the basis of very rudimentary, scattered, and varied experience” (Chomsky 2001, 20).
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perhaps even when enlightened, it may not be possible to maintain the non-self
perspective consistently. Smith poses a challenge to my claim about the epistemic role
of vipassanā meditation as a form of “verificationism” and suggests that it might have
a different function in Buddhist soteriology. Siderits argues, as I briefly mentioned
earlier, that extinguishing the I-sense requires extinguishing the bundle of cognitive
and affective habits that constitute the I-sense and this requires not extinguishing the
phenomenal illusion of self through vipassanā but the creation of new cognitive and
affective habits.
I will begin with Smith’s challenge to my understanding of the epistemic role of
vipassanā. Smith argues that “we should not think of mindfulness meditation as a way
of verifying Buddhist philosophical insights but as a way of actively conditioning the
perceptual apparatus such that those Buddhist principles and views we antecedently
endorse become pre-reflective ways of taking up our world.” He offers as an example
a form of mindfulness meditation wherein the practitioner is encouraged to imagine the
body as a corpse in the various stages of decay or as a set of dismembered elements,
the way a butcher might look a cow. The point of these mental exercises, Smith argues,
is not verification but to project an image onto the body whose purpose is to internalize
an already held philosophical position and create an attitude of detachment. Finally,
Smith also argues that thinking of vipassanā as a form of verificationism “flattens the
normative implications of the practice.”
I will begin my response to these worries by focusing on the examples he gives of
an alternative form of mindfulness. Clearly this is a different form than the nonjudgmental moment to moment attention that I discuss in my article. Still, the difference
is less significant than it might initially appear. Both may be considered forms of
controlled experiments, and the thought experiment which Smith highlights has as its
purpose to focus on something that one can recognize is true about the body – that since
it will decay or can be carved up like a piece of meat, it is a mistake to become attached
to it. While these thought experiments begin with projection and imagination, it is
fundamentally connected to something real, unlike a thought experiment where one
imagines oneself, for example, as a butterfly. The thought experiment can then function
as a hypothesis which can be confirmed by focusing on what happens to one’s attitude
to the body if one performs the experiment in a serious and consistent way. I think it
can be verified that individuals who embark on this experimental practice, will tend to
develop an attitude of non-attachment to the body.17
The form of vipassanā that I discuss in my article – an open receptivity and nonjudgmental attention to passing phenomena – is also a form of controlled experiment.
It is not the way we “normally” function in the world, and it is not like ordinary
introspection. As I noted in my article, one Buddhist practitioner and teacher of
mindfulness compares it to an electronic microscope. I think this metaphor is especially
appropriate, as this method of meditation allows one to observe the processes of the
17

The experiment can be performed more vividly and realistically. Monks in Thailand still to this day
go to a morgue and observe actual corpses in various stages of decay, saying to themselves “this is my
fate.”
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mind in micro-detail. In this way it can verify certain assumptions that Buddhism uses
to argue for the doctrine of no-self – the impermanence of these processes, that they
arise in dependence on other processes, that they are not subject to control, etc.
Nonetheless, I would, agree with Smith that the main point of this attention to the
continuous flow of psychophysical process is to internalize philosophical assumptions
“antecedently endorsed” and to recondition our faculties in order to bring about a
different way of being in the world. Thus, the experiential verification of the Buddhist
assumptions is a verification of how those principles can be applied to and re-condition
one’s own experience. Eventually, it begins to verify that the self is an illusion through
micro no-self experiences (micro-moments of Nirvāṇa) which, as one continues on the
path, become more predominant. Thus, the process of verifying Buddhist principles
does not flatten the normative and soteriological implications of the Buddhist practice
but rather serves as one of the initiators of the Buddhist path as well as one of its
continuous components.
Still, there is the problem of what it means to “verify” these assumptions, since
these assumptions guide the process of vipassanā meditation. In other words, the
verification process seems to be relying on the very principles that are to be verified.
There is, thus, no possibility of falsifying those principles. I take this as a serious
question whose answer would require much more than I can say here. What I will say
briefly is that strict Popperian falsifiability is not the only way to understand
verification. To understand how verification might work in vipassanā practice and,
indeed, in the whole of the Buddhist path, we might think of Buddhism as a “research
program” in Imre Lakatos’ sense of that term.18 Understood in this way, the Buddhist
research program would not be judged by whether its core principles were falsifiable,
but whether embarking on and following the Buddhist path can lead to progress toward
its soteriological goal, whether “walking the walk” based on experientially knowing
and internalizing Buddhist principles leads to the progressive overcoming of suffering.
In some ways I have already provided my answer to Siderits’ criticism, but I now
want to look at his criticism in some detail and explain my response. I already discussed
Siderits’ claim that the I-sense is not a phenomenal illusion but is constituted by a
bundle of cognitive and affective habits. If this were all there was to the I-sense, it
would then follow that to extinguish the I-sense is not to extinguish the phenomenal
illusion of self but to extinguish these habits. The key to doing this, for Siderits, is not
to dispel something with a phenomenal character but to change the habits of thought
that produce delusion and to cultivate “counter virtues, affective habits that help us
unlearn such deeply engrained vices as anger, resentment, and jealousy.” Thus,

18

See Lakatos 1970. For Lakatos, science is best understood as a research program consisting of a set of
hard core theories, which are refutation resistant, and a variety of “auxiliary hypotheses,” which in
conjunction with the hard core theories generate predictions that are subject to empirical tests. If the
predictions are disconfirmed, it is the auxiliary hypotheses that are given up, while the hard core is
retained. The research project can continue so long as it is “progressive,” which is to say, as long as it
can predict new and unexpected facts that can be tested and as long as it is capable of solving certain
anomalies that previous research programs cannot solve.
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extinguishing the I-sense would require not vipassanā but meditative practices that can
cultivate these counter-virtues.
Siderits highlights sympathetic joy and loving kindness as counter-virtues to be
cultivated. These are two of the four “immeasurables” or “boundless” qualities known
as the brama viharas, the other two being compassion and equanimity. Early Buddhism
and the Theravāda tradition have developed elaborate meditative techniques to
cultivate these qualities as has various Mahayana traditions.19 Thus, none of the
Buddhist traditions would disagree with at least one part of Siderits claim – that
overcoming our self-orientation requires forms of meditation that develop new
affective habits through the cultivation of counter-virtues. However, if there is, as I
have argued, a phenomenal illusion of self that is at least a component of the I-sense,
then it would seem to be appropriate to approach the problem of the illusion of self in
several ways – to extinguish it as a phenomenal illusion through vipassanā and to
extinguish it a set of affective habits through meditative techniques that can cultivate
the brama viharas. As for the cognitive habits, it would seem appropriate to confront
them with philosophical reflections and with both forms of meditation, as they are
bound up with the phenomenal illusion of self and the affective components of the Isense. In all, since the phenomenal illusion of self and the cognitive and affective
components of the I-sense intersect and interpenetrate, it is important to disentangle the
knot at all its corners.
To conclude, let me return to the analogy I used earlier. If we take the I-sense as a
program which organizes our experiences into forms of self-cherishing and selfgrasping, a program which produces the phenomenal illusion of self and develops selforiented cognitive and affective habits, then we need to dismantle the operating
program through both forms of meditation as well as through the other components of
the eight-fold path. And as we dismantle our self-cherishing and self-grasping program,
we can begin to put in its place a new program of selfless loving kindness, compassion,
sympathetic joy, and equanimity.
Once again, let me thank Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits for their
insightful comments and provocative criticisms. They have helped me think through
some of the issues at greater length, pushed me to further clarify and develop my
position and arguments, and, in some cases, to revise them. I hope my response here
will serve to further continue the dialogue in the future. Namaste.

19

For an excellent discussion of the significance of the brama viharas and meditative techniques to
cultivate them, see Feldman 2017. The Mahāyāna traditions tend to emphasize forms of meditation that
cultivate boundless compassion. The Tibetan Buddhist tradition has developed a set of meditative
practices known as lojong to get “the practitioner to adopt the project of bodhicitta in place of the project
of self-cherishing” (Locke 2018, 262).
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